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ABSTRACT
Online advertising has become a key source of revenue for
both web search engines and online publishers. For them,
the ability of allocating right ads to right webpages is crit-
ical because any mismatched ads would not only harm web
users’ satisfactions but also lower the ad income. In this
paper, we study how online publishers could optimally se-
lect ads to maximize their ad incomes over time. The con-
ventional offline, content-based matching between webpages
and ads is a fine start but cannot solve the problem com-
pletely because good matching does not necessarily lead to
good payoff. Moreover, with the limited display impressions,
we need to balance the need of selecting ads to learn true ad
payoffs (exploration) with that of allocating ads to generate
high immediate payoffs based on the current belief (exploita-
tion). In this paper, we address the problem by employing
Partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs)
and discuss how to utilize the correlation of ads to improve
the efficiency of the exploration and increase ad incomes in
a long run. Our mathematical derivation shows that the
belief states of correlated ads can be naturally updated us-
ing a formula similar to collaborative filtering. To test our
model, a real world ad dataset from a major search engine
is collected and categorized. Experimenting over the data,
we provide an analyse of the effect of the underlying pa-
rameters, and demonstrate that our algorithms significantly
outperform other strong baselines.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.6 [Computing Methodologies]: Artificial Intelligence—
Learning ; I.2.8 [Computing Methodologies]: Artificial
Intelligence—Problem Solving, Control Methods, and Search
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1. INTRODUCTION
Online advertising has received blooming development in
recent years. The volume of the industry has grown from
$8.1 billion in 2000 to $26 billion in 2010 with a new record
every year [1]. Online advertising is vitally important for
both web search engines and online content providers and
publishers because it provides them with major sources of
revenue. For example, Google search engine was serving
7.2 billion page views per day in 2011 [9] and its revenue is
mainly driven by advertising products like AdWords, Dou-
bleClick, and AdMob. Similarly, online content providers
such as Yahoo! and news agencies such as New York Times
increasingly choose advertising as the smarter alternative to
conventional subscription based services.
Online publishers can make profit by selling impressions
(an instance of an ad being seen on users’ monitors). A fun-
damental problem faced by publishers is that given limited
display impressions and ad slots, how to maximize their ad
incomes over time. It is a complex problem because in prac-
tice publishers usually need to make decisions considering
various aspects. First, they have to decide whether to deal
private contracts with advertisers or agencies directly, or to
participate in public ad networks or exchanges to reach more
demands. In [14] a queuing system was proposed to find the
optimal policy of selecting advertisers to make private con-
tracts, whereas in [6, 20], the focus is on pricing ads properly
in either of the two settings. Second, the payment scheme is
different and the publishers need to choose between pay-per-
view, pay-per-click, and possibly other models. A balance
can be established in a static setting as reported in [21, 13,
19]. Lastly and most importantly, a decision has to be made
on which page [8, 33] and which users [31, 28] these ads
should be matched with, probably in a real-time fashion us-
ing text summaries [3]. Traditionally the matching is done
by ad networks and advertisers are allowed to choose which
keywords they intend to bid. Now publishers are getting
more involved and can actively switch in real-time between
different pricing schemes and different networks in order to
increase their ad incomes, as demonstrated in the Google
DFP Small Business system [15] and some ad exchanges like
AdBrite (http://www.adbrite.com/).
This essentially allows online publishers to integrate the
above decisions all together in a more general framework to
optimize their ad revenue. Yet, the following challenges re-
main unsolved because of its dynamic settings: First, the
prior analysis of the matching between content and ads pro-
vides a fine start but a good payoff is not necessarily guaran-
teed by a good matching and need to be verified over time.
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With the limited display impressions, we also need to bal-
ance the need of selecting ads and their pricing schemes to
learn the true payoffs (exploration) with that of allocating
ads to generate high immediate payoffs based on the cur-
rent belief (exploitation). Second, online publishers have
more opportunities to explore from different ad networks
and pricing schemes provided ads are correlated. A key
question is how to make use of the correlations embedded
in the data to improve the efficiency of the exploration and
increase the ad incomes in a long run. In this paper, we
study the above two issues and formulate the sequential ad
selection problem by applying Partially observable Markov
decision processes (POMDPs). To provide a basic under-
standing of publisher revenue problem when dealing with
multiple ads or ad sources, we do not distinguish between
various trade mechanisms and pricing models, but instead
consider them essentially the same and focus on their pay-
offs. Moreover, to make our study focused, we formulate our
problem by considering the correlation of ads, while bearing
in mind that the same principle and result can be applied
to the correlation of webpages and users. Our mathematical
derivation shows that the belief states of correlated ads can
be naturally updated using a formula similar to collabora-
tive filtering. We examine the model on a carefully collected
dataset, and the results show that our models, particularly
with the new belief updates, outperform other strong base-
lines.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in
Section 2 we provide a discussion about related work and in
Section 3 we present the proposed model and its approxi-
mate solutions. The experiments are given in Section 4 and
conclusions are presented in Section 5.
2. RELATEDWORK
Previous research on publisher revenue optimization has
been mainly focused on display ads and their (private) con-
tracts. Traditionally the research question is limited to how
to choose advertisers to make (private) contracts with, as
elaborated in [12, 14, 26]. In [14] the authors used a queueing
system to accommodate advertisers and added constraint
that advertisers are impatient and would leave if their ads
cannot be displayed right way. A dynamic programming
solution was provided in [26] by combining the available ad
inventories and dynamically delivery of promised advertising
contract to the viewers. Although our model also optimizes
publisher revenue over time, the settings are different: we
focus on contextual advertising, where ads can be specified
using keywords or categories, and study how the matching
between webpages and ads can be established w.r.t. payoffs
over time. We introduce a simple yet general dynamical pay-
off model that helps to address the inventory management
problem while taking into account the correlation of ads.
An interesting variation of ad inventory management prob-
lem is to find the optimal pricing models. The pay-per-view
and pay-per-click models were discussed in [17]. In [21], the
study concluded that a combination of pay-per-view and
per-per-click pricing models may be the most optimal for
an advertiser who has to choose between them. The same
choice problem has later been studied in [13] and the au-
thor concluded that the optimal choice for a price taking
publisher is either pay-per-view or per-per-click but not a
combination of those two pricing models. Recently similar
conclusion was reported in [19], in which the competition
between two models was discussed but limited to a static
setting: a single period of planning horizon. Similarly in
[14] the authors assumed that the publisher could choose ad
networks to utilize remnant impressions after fulfilling con-
tracts. Our goal is similar to those papers since we are also
targeted to find optimal ad sources. However, our model is
focused on real-time impression-based setting; we also uti-
lize the correlation of ads to accelerate the discovery process,
and provide an analyse of the optimization problem over
time. For instance, different from [13] we do not make any
assumption on market elasticity; neither do we constraint
the publisher to a contract-first setup [14].
Another aspect of publisher revenue optimization is ad
scheduling with the constraint of geometrical features of
website, uncertainty of advertisers and available ad inven-
tory (impressions) [18, 26, 30]. If the publisher fails to
deliver promised impressions a good-will penalty would be
incurred. In [30] the ad scheduling problem was modelled
in video games and a dynamic algorithm was developed.
When considering pricing models, e.g. pay-per-click, pub-
lishers need to understand the webpage content and user
preferences to achieve a better scheduling. Because now dis-
playing ads may not earn the publisher anything if ads are
not relevant or users are not interested therefore no clicks.
Traditionally optimizing matching between webpages and
ads belongs to the field of contextual advertising research
[8, 24]. In [8] a system utilizing both semantic and syntactic
features was proposed to address the problem. Similarly the
correlation of user-ad (behaviour targeting) has also been
studied previously in [32, 11], focusing on improving adver-
tising effectiveness by modelling attitude and feedback from
users. Our study can be consider as a dynamical extension
of the above works. The contextual matching can be used
as a prior belief in our model and it can be updated and
verified using our update formulas sequentially.
In terms of techniques, our work is closely related to multi-
arm bandit with dependent arms discussed in [23] as we
also face a multi-period selection problem with an explo-
ration and exploitation dilemma. In [23] the dependencies
of candidates are modelled by clustering them first; after
that, a multi-arm bandit algorithm runs twice: first se-
lects a cluster and then a candidate in that cluster. Our
paper is different in that we directly model the dependen-
cies using a covariance matrix. The impact of correlation
is well formulated and illustrated by rigorously deriving the
belief updates once other correlated ads have been selected.
Specifically, the problem is formulated by applying Partially
Observable Markov Decision Processes (POMDPs) with dis-
crete action (selection of ads), continuous observations (pay-
offs), and continuous hidden states (performance of ads).
Our model is a special case of continuous POMDPs [10, 29],
where two-stage Gaussian generative processes and no tran-
sit of hidden states are considered during the planning hori-
zon. To provide an optimal ad selection, similar with [29,
27], we follow the Monte Carlo sampling approach to deal
with continuous observations and to approximate a Dynamic
Programming solution in the finite planning horizon. As a
complement of the approximation approach, we also extend
an Upper Confidence Bound algorithm [4] by integrating it
with our belief update method.
3. THE PROPOSED MODEL
3.1 The Sequential Payoff Model
In this section we formulate the sequential ad selection
problem for a publisher-side system. Suppose there is an
online publisher who wants to put ads on their hosting web-
pages to generate profits. The ads could be obtained from
various sources either by making contracts with advertisers
directly, by registering with ad networks, or by employing a
supply-side-platform [15]. We now formally introduce the se-
quential payoff model to describe how the publisher revenue
is earned from ads. Suppose there are N ads from various ad
networks or exchanges available for the publisher. For each
display impression, the publisher needs to decide which ad
should be selected. Without loss of generality, we consider
to make our selection decisions every M impressions and de-
note the decision times as t ∈ [1, ..., T ]. To stay focused, we
consider the impression has only one ad slot, while bearing
in mind that the scenario of multiple ad slots per impression
can be addressed by incorporating user click-through models
(for pay-per-click ads) to remove rank bias [25] or consider
them from different impressions (for pay-per-view ads).
For each time step t ∈ [1, ..., T ], we define
Ψ(t) =

s(1), x(1)
. . . , . . .
s(t− 1), x(t− 1)
 (1)
as the available information up to time t, where s(t) ∈ N
denotes the decision, i.e. the index of ad selected for the
time step t. We use the random variable X(t) to denote the
payoff gained at time step t and x(t) its realization.
Let pi be an arbitrary choosing policy according to the
information obtained so far. We define
s(t) ≡ pi(Ψ(t)) (2)
To simplify our notation, we use them exchangeably in the
rest of the paper. The cumulative payoff over time T with
certain policy pi is
Rpi(T ) ≡M
T∑
t=1
Xs(t)(t) (3)
Our goal is to choose an optimal policy to maximizeRpi(T ).
However, we do not observe any future xs(t)(t) (where t ≥ t′)
before making a decision about s(t) (at t = t′). For a
given webpage, we assume two generative processes to gen-
erate the payoffs as shown in Figure 1. First, we consider
the matching between ads and the webpage and denote the
true but unknown payoffs of ads over a webpage as µ, a
N -dimension vector. This vector is generated from a mul-
tivariate Gaussian distribution governed by mean vector θ
and covariance matrix Σ as the following
µ ∼ N (θ,Σ) (4)
where θ and Σ are the parameters of the model and can be
estimated beforehand from data. Meanwhile, considering
the fact that the payoffs are affected by either the visit-
ing users, some unexpected factors, or the uncertainty that
has not been well modelled from the Gaussian, the observed
payoffs are generated from the true payoffs by
X ∼ N (µ, σ20 · I) (5)
2σ 0
θ(T), Σ(T), 0θ(2), Σ(2), T-2θ(1), Σ(1), T-1
μ(2)μ(1)
s(1) s(2)
μ(T)
s(T)
x(1) x(2) x(T)
θ, Σ
Figure 1: The payoff model illustrated by an in-
fluence diagram representation with generative pro-
cesses of a finite horizon POMDP. In this diagram
the non-filled circular nodes represent variables in-
cluding belief states; the shaded nodes represent
rewards as well as observations of the system; the
black point nodes represent non-random values; and
the non-filled square rectangular nodes represent ac-
tions. The dotted lines indicate indirect dependency
and intermediate nodes are not drawn. Note that
s(·) also depends on σ20 but lines are not drawn for
simplicity.
where X is a N -dimension observed payoff vector and I is
the identity matrix. A simple variance σ20 is used to model
the noise. Note that our treatment of the uncertainty from
the underlying users is basic that we use a universal con-
stant to describe the possible noise. We will show in our
experiments that the noise factor, although simple, plays an
important role in controlling the sensitivity of our model.
For a more advanced treatment about user modelling, we
refer to [28]. Given the two-stage process, the objective of
the publisher is to find the optimal policy which maximizes
the expectation of the overall ad income through the period,
i.e.
pi∗ = arg max
pi
E [Rpi(T )]
= arg max
pi
E
[
T∑
t=1
Xs(t)(t)
]
= arg max
pi
T∑
t=1
E
[
Xs(t)(t)
]
= arg max
pi
T∑
t=1
∫
x
xs(t)(t)p(xs(t)(t)|Ψ(t))dx
= arg max
pi
T∑
t=1
θs(t)(t) (6)
where we drop M from Equation 3 because the decision is
independent of it. Note that θs(t)(t) is the shorthand for
µˆs(t)|Ψ(t), denoting the estimated expectation of µs(t) at
time step t giving all available information Ψ(t). It presents
our belief at time t. Our formulation is in fact a special case
of continuous POMDPs [10, 29], where µ is the hidden state
and X is the observation over time and our belief about µ
would be sequentially updated using a posterior probabil-
ity. Our next task is to provide the estimation θs(t)(t) at
each time step t after an ad has been selected and its payoff
has been observed. We are particularly interested in the up-
date for correlated ads, which will be discussed in the next
section.
3.2 Belief Updates
At each time step the publisher makes a decision, observes
the payoff, then updates expected payoffs of all ads. In or-
der to calculate the expected payoffs the publisher needs to
calculate the value of θ(t + 1) and Σ(t + 1) according to
observation xs(t)(t) and previous belief. In this section we
derive the update equation using Bayesian inference. Let us
first look at the brief update of the same ads. Suppose the
publisher has two ad candidates. The 1st ad was selected
at time step t and received a payoff of x1(t). With Bayes’
theorem and marginalizing µ1 out, we obtain the p.d.f. of
X1 conditioned on the new observation x1(t) and previous
available information Ψ(t):
p (x1|x1(t),Ψ(t))
=
∫
p (x1|x1(t),Ψ(t), µ1) p (µ1|x1(t),Ψ(t)) dµ, (7)
where we know
p
(
µ1|x1(t),Ψ(t)
) ∝ p(x1(t)|µ1,Ψ(t))p(µ1|Ψ(t))
∝ exp
{
−(x1(t)− µ1)2 − (µ1 − θ1(t))2} (8)
and by inspecting the exponent part, we can find the poste-
rior distribution of µ1 as
µ1|x1(t) ∼ N
(
θ1(t+ 1), σ
2
1(t+ 1)
)
(9)
θ1(t+ 1) =
σ21(t)x1(t) + σ
2
0θ1(t)
σ21(t) + σ
2
0
σ21(t+ 1) =
σ21(t)σ
2
0
σ21(t) + σ
2
0
where similarly we write σ2i (t) as the shorthand for σ
2
i |Ψ(t).
Substituting the posterior of µ1 into Equation 7 gives the
expected payoff of the selected ad as
X1|x1(t),Ψ(t) ∼ N
(
θ1(t+ 1), σ
2
0 + σ
2
1(t+ 1)
)
(10)
where recall that we assume the prior noise σ20 is known.
3.2.1 Correlated Ads
In a real world situation the payoffs of ads are correlated.
Similar products, using similar creative, or targeting similar
potential customers will generate similar payoffs. By consid-
ering the correlation of ads the publisher could find a more
efficient way of identifying best candidates because not only
the beliefs of the selected ads themselves can be updated us-
ing Equation 10, but so do the other correlated ads. Again
with Bayes’ theorem and marginalizing µ1 out, we obtain
the p.d.f. of X2 conditioned on the observation x1(t) and
previous available information Ψ(t)
p (x2|x1(t),Ψ(t))
=
∫
p (x2|µ2, x1(t),Ψ(t)) p(µ2|x1(t),Ψ(t))dµ2 (11)
where
p(µ2|x1(t),Ψ(t))
∝ p(x1(t)|µ2,Ψ(t))p(µ2|Ψ(t))
= p(µ2|Ψ(t))
∫
p(x1(t)|µ1,Ψ(t))p(µ1|µ2,Ψ(t))dµ1 (12)
With the covariance known, we have the conditional dis-
tribution of µ1 on µ2 as
µ1|µ2 ∼ N (θ1|µ2, σ21 |µ2) (13)
θ1|µ2 = θ1 + σ1,2
σ22
(µ2 − θ2)
σ21 |µ2 = σ21 −
σ21,2
σ22
where σ1,2 is the covariance of {µ1, µ2}. Substituting them
into Equation 12 gives
µ2|x1(t) ∼ N (θ2(t+ 1), σ22(t+ 1)) (14)
θ2(t+ 1) = θ2(t) + σ1,2
x1(t)− θ1(t)
σ21(t) + σ
2
0
σ22(t+ 1) = σ
2
2(t)−
σ21,2
σ21(t) + σ
2
0
Similarly substituting the posterior of µ2 from Equation 14
to Equation 11 we obtain the expected payoff of the non-
selected ad as
X2|x1(t),Ψ(t) ∼ N
(
θ2(t+ 1), σ
2
0 + σ
2
2(t+ 1)
)
(15)
Note the correctness of the equation can be verified by
setting the 1st and 2nd ads equal – if we have θ1 = θ2
and σ21 = σ
2
2 = σ1,2, then Equation 14 becomes exactly
Equation 9. Therefore we take Equation 14 as the unified
equation covering both self and correlated updates. The
objective function in Equation 6 is now completed with the
belief update formulas (constraints), all of which are now
summarized together as the following
pi∗ = arg max
pi
T∑
t=1
θs(t)(t) (16)
subject to
θs(t+1)(t+ 1) = θs(t+1)(t) + σs(t),s(t+1)
xs(t)(t)− θs(t)(t)
σ2s(t)(t) + σ
2
0
(17)
σ2s(t+1)(t+ 1) = σ
2
s(t+1)(t)−
σ2s(t),s(t+1)
σ2s(t)(t) + σ
2
0
(18)
It is worth noticing that the update in Equation 17 is
closely related to the “word of mouth” heuristic adopted in
collaborative filtering [7, 16]. In the collaborative filtering
approaches, particularly, the user-based ones, the rating of
a target user is estimated by looking at other similar users;
The more similar a user is, the more contribution he or she
would have to the prediction. Using the heuristic, the fi-
nal rating prediction is a weighted average across all similar
users [16] and the similarity is usually measured by cosine
similarity or Pearson’s correlation coefficient and user means
are used to remove the bias of mean ratings among users [7].
In this paper, using a simple Gaussian model, we naturally
derive a collaborative update mechanism across correlated
ads. The major difference is that the update is in a sequen-
tial way. As seen in Equation 17, the similarity measure here
is the correlation normalized by the variance, and θs(t+1)(t)
and θs(t)(t) are used to remove the bias from the mean pay-
offs between different ads. Moreover, Equation 18 naturally
provides the confidence of the predictions.
Optimizing Equation 16 leads to the exploration and ex-
ploitation dilemma. The publisher would like to earn more
by selecting the best known θs(t)(t) so far. But some ads
with higher variances might potentially have higher payoffs
and are also required to be selected in order to gather the
feedback. Not selecting the local best may result in a loss
of the immediate reward, but the loss, however, could be
compensated if any better alternatives can be found in later
stages. Besides, we can see from the model that the chang-
ing dataset problem is dealt with naturally: the new coming
ads could be simply assigned high variances to encourage
the exploration on them.
3.3 Exact Solution
3.3.1 Value Iteration
Our revenue optimization problem in Equation 16 could
be solved exactly following a value iteration approach using
Dynamic Programming [5]. Recall we use θ and Σ to denote
the belief of N ads true payoffs before t = 1. Let V ∗(θ,Σ, T )
denote the max possible revenue the publisher could gain in
T time steps. We have the following statement and the
Bellman equation [5].
Lemma 1. For any given priori θ and Σ, there exists
an optimal policy pi∗ to the problem in Equation 16, and
V ∗(θ,Σ, T ) is achievable. More over V ∗(θ,Σ, T ) satisfy the
following condition
V ∗ (θ,Σ, T )
= max
s(1)∈N
E
[
Xs(t)(1) + V
∗ (θ|Xs(t)(1),Σ|Xs(t)(1), T − 1)]
(19)
By solving this equation recursively we find the optimal
policy. If T = 1, we write the optimal revenue as
V ∗(θ,Σ, 1) = max
s(1)∈N
E
[
Xs(1)(1)
]
= max
s(1)∈N
θs(1)(1) (20)
which indicates that the publisher should simply choose the
ad with highest expected payoff. This choice is straight-
forward because no more time steps exist, thus no need of
exploration.
For T = 2 the optimal revenue is written as
V ∗(θ,Σ, 2)
= max
s(1)∈N
E
[
Xs(1)(1) + V
∗ (θ|Xs(t)(1),Σ|Xs(t)(1), 1)]
= max
s(1)∈N
∫
p(xs(1))
(
xs(1) + U
∗(θ|xs(t)(1),Σ|xs(t)(1), 1)
)
dxs(1)
= max
s(1)∈N
∫
p(xs(1))
(
xs(1) + max
s(2)∈N
(
θs(2)(2)
))
dxs(1)
= max
s(1)∈N
(
θs(1)(1) +
∫
max
s(2)∈N
p(xs(1))θs(2)(2)dxs(1)
)
(21)
The difficulty lies in the last integral as it depends on the
max operator. Using Chasles relation, it could be expanded
to several regional integrals according to the random vector
θ(2). For instance, if the publisher has to choose from only
two ads, and by solving θ1(2) > θ2(2) the following answer
is obtained
θ1(2) > θ2(2) when xi(1) > k (22)
which indicates the publisher should choose the 1st ad when
the observation from the 1st time step is bigger than some
value k. Then the last integral of Equation 21 could be
broken into two regional integrals with exact solution
V ∗(θ,Σ, 2) = max
i∈1,2
(
θ1(1) +
∫ k
−∞
p(xi)θ2(2)dxi
+
∫ +∞
k
p(xi)θ1(2)dxi
)
(23)
The above equation could be easily extended to N ads
cases provided the solution of N inequalities for vector θ,
where the only variable considered as unknown is the obser-
vation from the last time step. For simplicity we define that
a region is dominated by some ad when the ad should be
selected if the observation falls in the region. This is similar
with [27] where the value function is expressed as a linear
combination of α-functions. Formally we denote the region
dominated by i-th ad at time step t as [mi,t, ni,t]. For a
general case of N ads, Equation 21 is written as
V ∗(θ,Σ, 2) = max
s(1)∈N
(
θs(1)(1) +
N∑
s(2)
∫ ns(2),2
ms(2),2
p(xi)θs(2)(2)dxi
)
(24)
where the regional integral could be solved as∫ n
m
xp(x)dx = −σ2
(
p(n)− p(m)
)
+ µ
(
φ(n)− φ(m)
)
(25)
where φ(x) is the c.d.f. for the Gaussian random variable X.
Note that for some ads at some time steps, their dominant
regions could be empty, simply indicating the ads would
never be selected under such circumstances.
3.3.2 A Toy Example
We give an example to demonstrate the sequential se-
lection mechanism with embedded correlated belief update.
Assume a publisher have 2 ads to select from. The Gaussian
noise from users is given by
σ20 = 0.1
Random state µ is defined by a bivariate Gaussian, i.e.
µ ∼ N (θ,σ)
where
θ =
 1
0.95
 Σ =
 10 0.2
0.2 50

Considering only one time step gives the expected revenue
V ∗(θ,Σ, 1) = max
s(1)∈N
E
[
Xs(1)(1)
]
= max(1, 0.95)
= 1 with s(1) = 1
Now consider T = 2. Suppose the 1st ad at the 1st time
step is selected, which yields the following update for time
step 2
when s(1) = 1 :
θ1(2) = 1− 10× (1− x1(1))
0.1 + 10
θ2(2) = 0.95− 0.2× (1− x1(1))
0.1 + 10
which gives
θ1(2) > θ2(2) when x1(1) > 0.95
Thus, the optimal reward for t = 2 when choosing s(1) = 1
could be derived as
V ∗s(1)=1(θ,Σ, 2)
=1 +
∫ +∞
0.95
p(x1)θ1(2)dx1 +
∫ 0.95
−∞
p(x1)θ2(2)dx1
=3.1993
A small defect is that variable x stands for the payoff ob-
served from the 1st time step and it cannot be smaller than
zero. However, due to the Gaussian assumption, when calcu-
lating V ∗, we integrate x over the Real space and sometime
result in a negative expected reward. But such policy would
vanish in later comparisons due to its low value and has little
effect on our decision process.
Similarly selecting the 2nd ad at the 1st time step yields
the following update for step 2
when s(1) = 2 :
θ1(2) = 1− 0.2× (0.95− x2(1))
0.1 + 50
θ2(2) = 0.95− 50× (0.95− x2(1))
0.1 + 50
which gives
θ1(2) > θ2(2) when x2(1) < 1.00
Thus we have
V ∗i=2(θ,Σ, 2)
=0.95 +
∫ 1
−∞
p(x2)θ1(2)dx2 +
∫ +∞
1
p(x2)θ2(2)dx2
=4.7291
Finally the maximum expected payoff over two time steps
is
V ∗(θ,Σ, 2) = max(3.1993, 4.7291) = 4.7291
and the corresponding optimal policy is
pi∗ = {s(1) = 2, s(2) = 1 if x1(1) < 1, s(2) = 2 otherwise}
From the result, we can see that the optimal policy is
different from a myopic one, which tries to maximize the
immediate reward only. Following the myopic policy the
publisher would choose s(1) = 1 and receive a smaller pay-
off. One of the reasons of selecting the 2nd is because it
has a higher variance (taking into account the correlations
as well). We will show in the experiments that such high
variance is ordinary in real world data.
3.4 Approximate Solution
In order to understand approximations we write the ob-
jection function as a combination of immediate reward es-
timation and exploration function, which utilizes the avail-
able information up to the decision time step, denoted by
ξ(Ψ(t), i) for the i-th candidate. The decision criteria is to
maximize some the objective value function Vs(t)(Ψ(t)), i.e.
s(t) = arg max
s(t)∈N
Vs(t)(Ψ(t))
= arg max
i∈N
(x¯i + ξ(Ψ(t), i)) (26)
Algorithm 1 The vi-cor algorithm using value iteration
with Monte Carlo sampling.
function ValueFunc(θ,Σ, t)
array V ← 0 . Expected reward vector.
loop i← 1 to N
V [i]← θi(t) . Expected immediate reward.
if t < T then
for all s in Sample(θ,Σ) do
[θ′,Σ′]← UpdateBelief(θ,Σ, s, i)
. New belief after selecting i and observing s.
. Equations 17 and 18.
V [i]← V [i] + 1
M0
ValueFunction(θ′,Σ′, t+ 1)
end for
end if
end loop
return [Max(V ),MaxIndex(V )]
end function
Algorithm 2 The ucb1-normal-cor algorithm using
multi-armed bandit with correlated update.
function Plan(θ,Σ,Ψ(t))
array V ← 0
loop i← 1 to N
if ti < d8 log te then
return i
end if
end loop
[θ′,Σ′]← UpdateBelief(θ,Σ,Ψ(t))
. New belief of all ads with all available information.
. Equations 17 and 18.
loop i← 1 to N
V [i]← θ′i +
√
16 · qi−tiθ′2i
ti−1 ·
t−1
ti
. Expected reward.
end loop
return [max(V ),MaxIndex(V )]
end function
For example, the exploration function in Equation 19 is
ξ =
∫
p(xs(1))V
∗ (θ|xs(t)(1),Σ|xs(t)(1), T − 1) dx (27)
of which the computation is expensive due to recursive call-
ing and integral. In this section we present two approximate
methods.
3.4.1 Value Iteration with Monte Carlo Sampling
For T ≥ 3 the solution for N inequalities cannot be ob-
tained easily. Instead we use Monte Carlo sampling to deal
with the integral and avoid solving the inequalities. The
exploration function is written as
ξvi-cor =
1
M0
∑
x∈S
p(x)V ∗ (θ|x,Σ|x, T − 1) dx (28)
where S is the sample set and M0 is the normalizing factor
from sampling. The algorithm for a general T ≥ 3 case is
represented in Algorithm 1. We refer to this algorithm as
vi-cor in our experiments.
3.4.2 The UCB1-Normal-COR Algorithm
The multi-armed bandit is a popular approach dealing
with exploration-exploitation dilemma in sequential opti-
mization problems [4]. Similar to the problem discussed
above, in the multi-armed bandit scenario a player must
decide which arm to play at each time step to maximize the
cumulative reward over the entire planning horizon.
Most multi-armed bandit algorithms reduce the compu-
tational cost by approximating the exploration function. In
this paper we base on the deterministic policy ucb1-normal
[4] and improve its performance by adding the correlated up-
date. The original algorithm assumes the Gaussian distri-
bution of the reward, independence between arms, and un-
derlying mean and variance for reward distribution are un-
known but fixed. The exploration function of ucb1-normal
is written as
ξucb1-normal =
√
16 · qi − tiθ
2
i (t)
ti − 1 ·
t− 1
ti
(29)
where qi is the sum of squared reward obtained from i-th
arm, and ti the times i-th has been played so far. We ex-
tend the algorithm for our problem by adding the correlated
updates. The exploration function would remain the same
form, but θ(t) at each time step is updated according to
Equations 17 and 18, instead of only updating the selected
candidate. The algorithm, referred to as ucb1-normal-cor
in our experiments, is represented in Algorithm 2.
4. EMPIRICAL EXPERIMENTS
4.1 Dataset
We collected our test data set from Google AdWords ser-
vice [2]. We consider the scenario that advertisers deploy
campaigns through an advertiser (demand) side platform,
whereas online publishers retrieve ads and earn revenue from
a related publisher side platform. Generally, online pub-
lishers share the ad revenues with their chosen ad networks
or exchanges with a fixed percentage. For instance, with
Google AdSense online publishers gain 68% of advertisers’
spending, where the ratio has not changed since 2003 [22].
Thus, it is reasonable for us to consider online publishers’
ad revenue to be proportional to the corresponding revenue
of Google AdWords and also the corresponding cost of the
advertisers.
The test data was collected from 12/2011 to 5/20121.
The Google AdWords Traffic Estimation service provides
real-time data to help advertisers to adjust budgets and se-
lect appropriate keywords. When given a keyword, budget,
and various targets, the service will return a list of fields on
a daily basis including clicks, global and local impressions,
average position, average cost-per-click, and total cost. In
addition, we also separated the US and UK markets using
the geographical targeting option of the service. We have
collected keywords across the Google Sponsored Search and
Display Networks and do not make a distinction between the
types of ads and their specific payment schemes. This al-
lows online publishers to fully concentrate upon the revenue
optimisation task. During the collection period 521 differ-
ent keywords from various categories were collected and 310
have non-zero mean payoffs. As shown in Table 1, we man-
ually categorized the keywords into 8 categories to reflect
that fact that it is not necessary for online publishers to try
out all the available ads; instead they should specify their
target categories (based on hosting webpages content) and
1The dataset is publicly available at http://www.
computational-advertising.org.
Category Count Category Count
Education 34 Person & organization 29
Shopping 86 (Personal) finance 51
Product & service 20 Information 52
Medical 25 Uncategorised 13
Table 1: Categorisation of the collected 310 key-
words with non-zero mean payoffs.
make optimal decisions within the targeted categories. In
our experiments, ads associated with the collected keywords
were considered as candidates and decision making was on
a daily basis.
4.2 Baselines and Experiment Setup
The baselines used in our experiment are:
• random policy, which selects candidates randomly (uni-
form);
• myopic policy, which selects candidates based on im-
mediate reward estimated so far;
• ucb1 policy, which assumes independent between can-
didates and is model-free of reward distribution [4];
and
• ucb1-normal policy, which assumes independent be-
tween candidates and the reward following Gaussian
distribution;
And our algorithms are:
• vi-cor policy, which uses value iteration with Monte
Carlo sampling (Algorithm 1); and
• ucb1-normal-cor policy, which consider the depen-
dencies between candidates (Algorithm 2).
For each candidate we have about 150 daily payoff data
points (some candidates have less due to later start of col-
lection). For each category (except Uncategorised) we se-
lect candidates with close mean payoffs to form a dataset,
emphasizing the challenge of planning with matching can-
didates. In order to test the statistical significance of algo-
rithms performance, we divide daily payoff time series into
8 chunks for each dataset (with overlap). For each chunk,
we use 20% as the training set to get the prior belief of ad
performances, i.e. θ(0) and Σ(0). Then we go over the re-
maining 80% with each algorithm reporting the cumulative
reward at each time step. Besides, we report the averaged
results with Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the significance
of the best algorithm outperformed the second best within
each dataset.
4.3 Results and Discussions
We compared our two algorithms with the baselines over
the 10 selected datasets. In order to compare performances
across categories we normalize the cumulative revenues against
the golden solution (always picking up the best ads) to give
a better representation due to the different scales of means
from different categories. The results are summarized in
Table 2 and are compared in Figure 2. We can see that,
within the 10 different datasets, the proposed vi-cor al-
gorithm performed the best for 8/10 with 5/8 significantly
better. The ucb1-normal-cor algorithm performed the
best for 1/10 and was significantly better in that trail. With
the“Shopping-1”dataset, the ucb1 algorithm performed the
best, but the vi-cor had the comparable performance and
the difference was not significant.
In Figure 2 we give daily performance comparison on “Ed-
ucation” and “People & Organization” datasets where algo-
Datasets myopic random ucb1 ucb1-normal vi-cor ucb1-normal-cor
Education 21.9 23.0 30.9 30.9 41.2* 27.6
Finance-1 38.5 27.8 40.9 26.4 44.5 27.4
Finance-2 22.1 16.5 30.6 22.8 38.0* 22.9
Information 14.1 12.9 27.8 15.9 29.4 15.9
People & Organization 41.6 30.4 50.5 31.4 72.9* 63.3
Shopping-1 17.4 10.6 42.3 16.1 40.2 16.4
Shopping-2 29.9 14.5 34.3 75.3 52.9 79.2*
Shopping-3 9.7 4.3 21.9 18.3 27.3 19.4
Product & Service 24.7 26.0 47.2 57.1 67.9* 59.9
Medical 30.5 19.6 52.7 32.2 58.0* 33.5
Table 2: The overall performance comparison. The cumulative payoffs are averaged on 8 chunks then nor-
malized w.r.t. the GOLDEN policy for a better representation. In each row the one with highest cumulative
payoff is in bold and with * if the difference with the second best is significant.
eminem justin
bieber
michael
jackson
selena
gomez
wayne
rooney
eminem 1.00 -0.43 -0.58 -0.50 -0.73
justin
bieber
1.00 0.80 0.74 0.70
michael
jackson
1.00 0.97 0.71
selena
gomez
1.00 0.63
wayne
rooney
1.00
Table 3: The sample correlation matrix for “Peo-
ple & Organization” category. The high correlations
made the UCB1 and UCB1-Normal inefficient.
rithm were run on entire payoff data series. We cannot rep-
resent all 10 figures due to the space limit; the performances
were however consistent across all datasets. We discuss our
findings in the following subsections.
4.3.1 The Importance of Exploration
Firstly we study the importance of exploration. Figure 2
compares the daily accumulated revenues over time. As il-
lustrated in Figure 2(a), in the beginning (between day-0
and day-10) the myopic policy achieved excellent result and
its cumulative payoff was the best until day-65. This is ex-
plained by the fact that there is no exploration involved in
this policy and it exploits the current belief directly. How-
ever our algorithms with exploration quick outperformed it
in the late stage as more profitable ads have been discovered
from the exploration from the early stage. In the end, the
myopic policy failed to win due to no exploration in the be-
ginning, and later stuck to suboptimal ads. It is similar in
Figure 2(b) where the myopic policy outperformed others
between day-25 and day-35, but was caught up and passed
very soon. These conclude that the exploration is valuable
and important in the ad selection task. Note that we only
show categories “Education” and “People & Organization”
only, while the algorithms behaviours were consistent across
all datasets.
4.3.2 The Effect of Correlation
Recall we consider the Gaussian noise constant for all web-
pages and users. The consequence is that X1 and X2 are
conditional independent when we know µ1 and µ2. We can
further derive the relationship between covariances of X1
and X2 and that of µ1 and µ2 as,
cov[X1, X2] = E
[
cov[X1, X2|µ1, µ2]
]
+ cov
[
E[X1|µ1, µ2],E[X2|µ1, µ2]
]
= cov[µ1, µ2] (30)
which enables publishers to use either of correlations within
the model. In experiments we used cov[X1, X2].
Like most multi-bandit machine approaches, the ucb1 al-
gorithm assumes independence between candidates. There-
fore when candidates have relatively low correlations, e.g.
in the “Shopping-1” dataset, the algorithm would perform
well. This was confirmed by the observation that the ucb1-
normal-cor algorithm reported only 0.3% improvement
over ucb1-normal in that dataset. But in the situation
where the correlation of ads are high such as the “People
& Organization” category (a sample correlation matrix is
shown in Table 3), our algorithms utilizing the correlation
during planning showed better results. For instance the vi-
cor algorithm showed 22.4% improvement over the ucb1
and the ucb1-normal-cor showed 31.9% improvement over
the ucb1-normal in the “People & Organization” dataset.
In Figure 2(b) it was clear that ucb1-normal-cor discov-
ered the better options much quicker than the ucb1-normal
did. The same conclusion is obtained by comparing the vi-
cor with the myopic solution. From Figure 3, we can see a
significant improvement by utilizing correlation of ads. The
maximum improvement was obtained with “Product & Ser-
vice” (43.3%) and on average it was 22.2% across all exper-
iments.
4.3.3 The Impact of the Noise Factor σ20
The introduction of the noise factor σ20 is essential to the
success of our model. On one hand, it helps capture the un-
certainty which is unforeseeable and has not been properly
modelled by the underlying θ and Σ as we discussed be-
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Figure 2: Comparison on accumulated payoffs.
fore. The assumption about the Gaussian distribution may
not be true in practice. This can be seen from Figure 4(a)
and Figure 4(b). The noise factor provides us with a cer-
tain flexibility of tuning our algorithms towards the specific
situations. In our experiments, we obtained the noise factor
by tuning using training datasets.
On the other hand, the noise factor is also a control of the
sensitivity of the algorithms towards the unexpected daily
payoff fluctuation. From Equations 17 and 18 we see that
the noise factor is in the denominator and a high noise factor
leads to a steady policy while a low one leads to a highly
responsive (sensitive) policy. A smaller value, for example
σ20 = 0.01, would make the algorithm switch probably too
much, whereas a larger value would not be able to capture
the fluctuation of the data. We found from the data that
sometimes strong and short bursts may happen and be led
by unexpected commercial activities. For instance, in the
beginning of May, 2012 the Sumsang Galaxy S III and Nokia
808 PureView were presented for pre-ordering or purchasing,
and both claimed to be the ‘best’ on the market. The com-
petition of commercial campaigns caused the daily payoff
of “best phones” became very high between 15/04/2012 and
05/05/2012 (Figure 4(b)). In order to response to such a
short and strong abnormal activity a small noise factor is
required. From Figure 4(c) we see that with σ20 ≤ 40 the
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Figure 3: Comparison on accumulated payoffs on the
10 datasets. VI-COR always performed better than
MYOPIC and UCB1-NORMAL-COR always performed
better than UCB1-NORMAL across all datasets.
vi-cor algorithm was able to identify and switch to “best
phones” when the burst happened; but with σ20 ≥ 60 the al-
gorithm was not able to switch, resulting in a loss of payoff.
It is worth noticing that, as illustrated in Figure 4(c), the
setting of the noise factor is algorithm-dependent as well. By
contrast, the ucb1-normal-cor approach requires a large
noise value to deal with the burst – the best cumulative pay-
off was obtained at σ20 = 40, and as the value of the noise
factor decreased the performance dropped greatly. The dif-
ferent behaviour of two algorithms is due to the different
structures of the exploration function. As shown in Equa-
tion 29, the exploration function of the ucb1-normal-cor
contains the squared expectation of the payoffs in the past,
indicating that the candidate with a history of low payoffs
would not be favoured especially with a sudden burst. Using
a high noise value would increase the chance of selecting and
exploring such candidates.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have presented a model of optimally se-
lecting ads in an online setting. Based on POMDPs, we
formulated the belief updates by taking the correlation of
ads into account. We mathematically showed that the be-
lief update across ads is similar to the “word of month”
principle employed in collaborative filtering. Making use of
the belief update, two approximate methods were proposed:
one was derived from the Value Iteration and Sampling ap-
proach, whereas the other was based on the Upper Con-
fidence Bound solution. In empirical experiments we com-
pared our algorithms with various baselines using a collected
real world dataset and showed that the Bayesian inference
with correlations made the exploration more efficient and
significantly improved the revenue optimization.
In the future, we intend to extend the basic model by con-
sidering the correlations between webpages as well to further
improve the exploration. A further study is also needed in
order to incorporate the user click-through model and re-
move rank bias on the same webpage [25].
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